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The manner in which individuals recall an autobiographical positive life event has affec-
tive consequences. Two studies addressed the processing styles during positive memory
recall in a non-clinical sample. Participants retrieved a positive memory, which was self-
generated (Study 1, n=70) or experimenter-chosen (i.e., academic achievement, Study 2,
n=159), followed by the induction of one of three processing styles (between-subjects):
in Study 1, a “concrete/imagery” vs. “abstract/verbal” processing style was compared.
In Study 2, a “concrete/imagery,” “abstract/verbal,” and “comparative/verbal” processing
style were compared. The processing of a personal memory in a concrete/imagery-based
way led to a larger increase in positive affect compared to abstract/verbal processing in
Study 1, as well as compared to comparative/verbal thinking in Study 2. Results of Study 2
further suggest that it is making unfavorable verbal comparisons that may hinder affective
benefits to positive memories (rather than general abstract/verbal processing per se). The
comparative/verbal thinking style failed to lead to improvements in positive affect, and with
increasing levels of depressive symptoms it had a more negative impact on change in pos-
itive affect. We found no evidence that participant’s tendency to have dampening thoughts
in response to positive affect in daily life contributed to the affective impact of positive
memory recall. The results support the potential for current trainings in boosting positive
memories and mental imagery, and underline the search for parameters that determine at
times deleterious outcomes of abstract/verbal memory processing in the face of positive
information.
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The regulation of positive affect and the processing of positive
material are gaining attention in the context of mood disorders
[e.g., Ref. (1–6)]. Depression, for instance, is not only character-
ized by increased negative affect but also by anhedonia, which
refers to reduced positive affect or reduced pleasure in daily activ-
ities [(7), p. 160]. Besides targeting negative affect, therefore,
promoting positive affect, targeting responses to positive stim-
uli may enhance interventions for depression [e.g., Ref. (1, 2,
8, 9)]. One specific type of positive stimuli is positive memo-
ries. In a review on blunted positivity in depression, Dunn (2)
has mentioned the need for more research on positive memories.
For instance, positive memories in formerly depressed individuals
have decreased vividness compared to never-depressed controls
(10). Further, Joormann et al. (11) showed that, whereas never-
depressed individuals are able to repair their sad mood by retriev-
ing positive memories, this strategy is unsuccessful in formerly
and currently depressed individuals. This suggests that recollec-
tion of positive memories may lead to multiple affective outcomes.
Therefore, knowledge of relevant thought patterns is crucial to
understand the relationship between positive memory recall and
affect.
For negative stimuli, the way a negative event is processed,
for instance, concrete/imagery-based vs. abstract/verbally based
processing, influences subsequent affective responding [e.g., Ref.
(12–14)]. A concrete/imagery-based processing style involves a
situation-specific sensory processing of the event, focused on
the experience of the moment (e.g., focusing on the sights and
sounds). Abstract/verbal processing of a certain situation is more
analytical and involves verbal thinking about the meanings, causes,
and consequences or implications of an event.
More recently, research on the impact of processing styles
was broadened from the domain of negative affect or situa-
tions to positive stimuli and positive memories [e.g., Ref. (5,
15, 16)]. When processing hypothetical positive situations, for
instance, concrete/imagery-based processing instructions improve
mood [e.g., Ref. (5, 15, 17)]. Mental imagery, therefore, is also
referred to as an “emotional amplifier” [e.g., Ref. (18)]. By con-
trast, participants in these experiments who were instructed to
think verbally (and abstractly) about positive scenarios do not
show mood improvement. Moreover, it is sometimes found that
verbal thoughts even lead to mood deterioration in the face of
positive information (5, 15).
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With regard to positive memories, Bryant et al. (19) demon-
strated that daily sessions of imagining positive memories increase
the amount of time that individuals report to feel happy. How-
ever, this study did not include a non-imagery control for positive
memories. Positive memories have also been investigated in clin-
ical samples as a strategy to repair sad mood: Werner-Seidler and
Moulds (16) demonstrated that concretely processing a joyful
memory may indeed help to reduce sad feelings in (previously)
depressed individuals (16). In contrast, an abstract thinking style
focused on causes, meanings, and consequences as well as on mak-
ing comparisons between a past happy memory and the current
life did not improve sad mood in (previously) depressed per-
sons [this was not entirely replicated when participants retrieved
a self-defining memory (20)].
Interestingly, it has been proposed that not all types of
abstract/verbal processing cause mood deterioration. For instance,
Holmes et al. [(5); Experiment 2] showed that especially making
active verbal comparisons could be responsible for mood deteri-
oration after verbal processing instructions for positive scenarios.
Thus, even in non-clinical samples, hypothetical “overly” posi-
tive situations (i.e., ones that incurred unfavorable comparisons)
could be stressful in that, in your own life, events may not end
up that positive. In addition to the detrimental effect of unfavor-
able comparisons on positive affect, we also suggest dampening
as a potential moderator of the impact of abstract/verbal pro-
cessing of positive events on positive affect. Interestingly, some
individuals are characterized by a “dampening response” style to
positive affect (21). Dampening is a particular cognitive response
style or emotion regulation strategy, defined as “the tendency
to respond to positive moods states with mental strategies to
reduce the intensity and duration of the positive mood state”
[(21), p. 509]. Examples of dampening thoughts in response to
positive affect are: “I do not deserve this,” “you know, these feel-
ings won’t last,” or “thinking about those times that did not go
well.” Dampening can be measured by the Responses to Positive
Affect questionnaire (RPA) (21, 22) and is positively associated
with depressive symptoms [e.g., Ref. (23)]. Dampening can be
regarded as a type of analytical thinking, in that it is charac-
terized by a negative interpretation or evaluation of the positive
situation.
In these studies, we wanted to investigate whether dampen-
ing also influences the impact of positive memory recall. From
research within social psychology, it has been suggested that adopt-
ing an abstract/verbal processing mode for a positive memory
(without an explicit focus on comparative thinking) can have
enhancing effects (24). This may be because abstract processing
can lead to positive elaborations or positive self-attributions (e.g.,
“I am a happy person,” “I am clever”) instead of interpreting the
event as an isolated moment (24). However, it is plausible that if
people characterized by a dampening response style think about
the meaning of a positive memory, that they will less easily gen-
erate a positive meaning or may even reduce the positivity of the
event. In this sense, dampening could be a potential moderator of
the effect of an abstract/verbal thinking style on affect. This is akin
to the idea that the impact of processing style on negative mood
is conditional on individual differences in trait rumination [e.g.,
Ref. (25)].
In two studies, we investigated which thought processes deter-
mine the impact of positive memory recall on positive affect.
In a first study, affective responding to concrete/imagery and
abstract/verbal processing of a self-generated positive memory
was investigated with a focus on dampening (and depressive
symptoms) as moderator. In a second study, we also examined
a comparative/verbal processing style.
STUDY 1
We compared the affective impact of a concrete/imagery process-
ing style focused on the sensorial and situation-specific details
with an abstract/verbal processing defined as thinking about
the broader meaning, causes, and consequences of an event. In
addition, we investigated the moderating role of dampening.
In line with research on positive scenarios and positive mem-
ories [e.g., Ref. (5, 16)], we predicted that the processing of a
positive memory in a concrete/imagery-based way would lead to
increased positive affect compared to a verbal/abstract condition.
With regard to an abstract/verbal processing style, we further pre-
dicted that this (immediate) change in positive affect would be
smaller with increasing levels of dampening thoughts in daily life
(due to minimizing or downgrading the positivity). Moreover, we
did not only examine positive affect immediately after the process-
ing of the memory but we also examined the affective impact of
the processing styles after a short delay. We did this for two main
reasons. First, we wanted to examine whether the processing styles
would elicit a differential affective pattern after a delay. Second, we
wanted to investigate the possibility that individuals characterized
by higher levels of a dampening response style may still profit from
positive memory recall, but only immediately. That is, it is possible
that dampeners reveal an adequate initial affective response, but
that the experienced positive feelings will be countered by down-
grading thoughts after a delay. We predicted that these dampening
thoughts would especially occur in the abstract/verbal condition,
leading to a more negative affective change with increasing levels
of dampening.
The study is conducted in a non-clinical sample. Given that
reduced responding to positive material has been linked to depres-
sion, we also took the level of depressive symptomatology into
account. Based on previous findings showing that mood improved
after positive memory recall in never-depressed individuals but
not in depressed individuals (11, 20), we predicted that increas-
ing levels of depressive symptoms would be associated with worse
affective outcomes.
METHOD
PARTICIPANTS
Seventy psychology students from the KU Leuven (University
of Leuven) participated; see Table 1 for characteristics. Written
informed consent was obtained at the beginning of the study.
There was no compensation for participation.
MEASURES
Affect assessment
Positive and negative affect were assessed using two visual analog
scales, on which participants had to indicate how they felt at the
moment. On the first scale, scores ranged from totally not in a pos-
itive mood (0) to in a very positive mood (100). The second scale
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Table 1 | Sample characteristics, memory characteristics (VAS), and
affect (VAS) per condition (Study 1).
Concrete/imagery
condition n=36
Abstract/verbal
condition n=34
Mean SD Mean SD
Gender (freq female) 32 31
Age 21.50 0.85 21.56 0.66
BDI-II 6.36 5.08 5.71 7.09
RPA-Dampening 10.81 2.65 11.50 3.39
Positivity of the event 8.52 1.33 8.56 1.06
Emotional (positive)
intensity – past
8.41 1.29 8.44 1.43
Emotional (positive)
intensity – retrieval
6.96 1.61 7.02 1.82
Positive affect
At baseline 6.18 2.03 6.41 2.16
After the induction 7.39 1.64 6.76 2.33
End of experiment 6.75 1.89 6.29 2.37
BDI-II, Beck Depression Inventory-II; RPA-Dampening, the Dampening subscale
of the Responses to Positive Affect questionnaire.
ranged from totally not dejected, “down,” sad, depressed (0) to very
dejected, down, sad, depressed (100)1.
Responses to positive affect questionnaire
The RPA (21) consists of 17 items scored on a 1 (almost never) to
4 (almost always) scale. Participants are requested to indicate how
often they respond in a certain way when feeling happy, excited,
or enthused. The RPA has three subscales: dampening (e.g., “My
streak of luck is going to end soon”), self-focused positive rumi-
nation (e.g., “I am achieving everything”), and emotion-focused
positive rumination (e.g., “Think about how happy you feel”). We
used the 16-item Dutch version for which adequate psychometric
properties are reported (22). In the current study, we focus on the
7-item dampening subscale, which had a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.72.
Beck depression inventory – second edition
The Beck depression inventory – second edition (BDI-II) (26)
measures severity of depressive symptoms and consists of 21 four-
choice statements. Participants are asked to indicate which of
the four statements best describes how they felt during the past
2 weeks. The total BDI-II score is computed by summing the 21
scores (ranging from 0 to 3), which offers a total score ranging from
0 to 63, with higher scores indicating more depressive symptoms.
We used the Dutch translation by Van der Does (27). Cronbach’s
alpha in the present sample was 0.89.
Ruminative response scale (RRS) and the autobiographical memory
test – minimal instructions
The ruminative response scale (RRS) (28) assesses the ten-
dency to ruminate when feeling sad, down, or depressed. In the
1The anchors of all visual analog scale were 0 and 100. Unfortunately, due to pho-
tocopying, the scales were 101 instead of 100 mm. The answers were processed in
centimeters and thus ranged from 0 to 10.1.
Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT)2 (29, 30), participants are
given 1 min to write down a personal memory in response to 10
cue-words. The study was set up for a broader purpose than the
one presented in the current paper. Consequently, the RRS and
AMT are not reported in the Section “Results.”
Memory assessment
Three visual analog scales ranging from 0 to 100 were presented
to assess the characteristics of the chosen event: (1) participants
indicated that how positive they considered the event on a scale
ranging from totally not positive to very positive (the most positive
emotional event from your life); (2) they rated the positive emo-
tional intensity of the event at the moment it originally occurred
on a scale ranging from totally not emotional to very emotional ; (3)
participants rated the positive emotional intensity that the episode
had at the moment of recollection, from totally not emotional to
very emotional.
Manipulation checks
Before and after the induction, level of self-focus and the focus
on words or images were assessed using two visual analog scales
ranging from 0 to 100: (1) at this moment, my attention is totally
not focused on myself to very much focused on myself; (2) at this
moment the things going through my head are mainly words to
mainly images.
PROCEDURE
The study was presented as a study on the emotional life of
university students and was conducted in a group setting. Par-
ticipants were randomly allocated to one of the two conditions
(abstract/verbal or concrete/imagery) via the distribution of dif-
ferent booklets. After giving their informed consent, participants
completed a first version of the AMT. Next, participants completed
the visual analog scales for negative mood, positive mood, self-
focus, and focus on words or images. Participants were instructed
to select a specific positive event from their own life, that is a
life circumstance in which they had felt very happy and in a very
positive mood. They were asked to write down a brief descrip-
tion of the specific episode. Next, they rated the chosen event on
several characteristics (i.e., positivity, emotional intensity). This
was followed by the processing style induction. In both condi-
tions (abstract/verbal and concrete/imagery), participants were
first instructed to think in the condition-specific style about their
memory. Further, the processing style manipulations involved
2During the AMT (written format), five positive and five negative cue words are
presented in an alternating order. We used the “Minimal Instructions” version of
the AMT (30). In this version, participants are asked to retrieve memories, without
emphasizing in the instructions that these should be specific. At the end, partici-
pants were requested to code their memories for specificity and imagery perspective
(dichotomous: first or third-person perspective). The administration of imagery
perspective during the baseline AMT allowed us to investigate the relation between
dampening and the use of an observer perspective during “unmanipulated” mem-
ory retrieval. For each subject, the number of observer and field memories was
calculated. RPA-Dampening was positively correlated with the number of observer
memories, r(68)= 0.37, p= 0.002 and negatively correlated with the number of
field memories, r(68)=−0.32, p= 0.01 (n= 68, two persons without perspective
ratings). These correlations had comparable effect sizes after control for BDI-II. The
correlations were independent of the valence of the cue word.
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asking five condition-specific questions, on which participants
were required to focus for a duration of 1 min per question.
In the abstract/verbal condition, participants were given the fol-
lowing instructions: Try to understand the event you described and
think about the possible causes of the event, the meanings and impli-
cations of the event for you and its consequences for you. Think in
words about why the episode happened as it did, about the meanings
and implications of the episode for you, and the consequences of the
episode for you. Consider what caused the episode and judge what
it says about you. Think about the episode in words and meanings,
using verbal language of the sort that you use when you speak. Then,
they were asked to answer the following five questions: “Why did
this event happen to you?; What was the meaning of this event in
your life?; What were the consequences and implications of this event
for you?; What did you think of yourself after the event?; What does
this event say about your personality?.” In the concrete/imagery con-
dition, participants were given the following instructions: Try to
build up a detailed image of the event, as if you were reliving the
event and as if a movie of the event was unfolding in your head.
Spend a few moments imagining the event as if you were really there
in the situation. Then, they were asked to answer the following
questions: “What could you see around you?; What could you hear?;
What could you feel, touch and experience in that situation?; What
was happening around you?; What happened immediately after the
event?.” The instructions and questions were framed to parallel
aspects of those used by Moberly and Watkins [(13), “concrete vs.
abstract”] and Holmes and Mathews [(12), “ imagery vs. verbal”]
as the imagery instructions appear virtually identical.
Immediately after the induction, students again completed the
visual analog scales for negative mood, positive mood, self-focus,
and focus on words or images. The delayed assessment of negative
and positive mood was conducted after the completion of a second
AMT, RRS, RPA, and BDI-II.
RESULTS
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND GROUP COMPARISONS
There were no differences between the two experimental con-
ditions for any of the background variables (Table 1): BDI-II,
t (68)= 0.45, p= 0.66, d = 0.11; RPA-Dampening, t (68)= 0.96,
p= 0.34, d = 0.23; positive affect pre-induction, t (68)= 0.46,
p= 0.65, d = 0.11; Distribution of gender was not significantly
different between the two conditions, χ2(1)= 0.10, p= 0.75.
MEMORY CHARACTERISTICS AND CONTENT
To exclude the possibility that condition-specific effects on affect
were due to baseline differences in memory characteristics, base-
line ratings of the positive memory were compared between the
two conditions. There were no significant differences between con-
ditions on the positiveness of the event, t (68)= 0.13, p= 0.90,
d = 0.03; emotional (positive) intensity of the event when the
event happened, t (68)= 0.11, p= 0.91, d = 0.03; and the emo-
tional (positive) intensity of the event at the moment of retrieval,
t (68)= 0.15, p= 0.89, d = 0.03. Means and standard deviations
are depicted in Table 1.
With regard to the content of the memories, we categorized the
memories. Forty-three participants retrieved a social memory, pri-
marily related to situations with family, friends, and partners (e.g.,
a nice evening out with friends, a special chat, being informed
about a newborn; 11 of them were related to a romantic rela-
tionship). Other memories referred to an achievement : a scholarly
(n= 22) or other achievement (n= 2). One participant reported
a memory related to the enjoyment of nature, and two memories
could not be categorized into one of the previous categories.
MANIPULATION CHECKS
Self-focus
To check that self-focus did not differ as a function of condition,
a repeated measures ANOVA was conducted with time (before vs.
after the processing style induction) as a within-subjects factor,
condition (concrete/imagery vs. abstract/verbal) as a between-
subjects factor, and self-focus as the dependent variable. The
interaction between time and condition was not significant, F(1,
68)= 1.38, p= 0.24,η2p = 0.02. The main effect of time was sig-
nificant, F(1, 68)= 6.47, p= 0.01,η2p = 0.09, d = 0.31, reflecting
an increase in self-focus following the induction.
Processing style – imagery/verbal
A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted with time (before
vs. after the processing style induction) as a within-subjects
factor, condition (concrete/imagery vs. abstract/verbal) as a
between-subjects factor, and focus on words vs. focus on images
as the dependent variable. There was a main effect of time,
F(1, 68)= 17.71, p< 0.001,η2p = 0.21. Critically, the interaction
between time and condition was significant, F(1, 68)= 13.35,
p< 0.001, η2p = 0.16, which is evidence for successful inductions.
There was an increase (i.e., more use of images) in the con-
crete/imagery condition, t (35)= 5.97, p< 0.001, d = 0.99, but
no change on the verbal/imagery scale in the abstract/verbal
condition, t (33)= 0.37, p= 0.72, d = 0.06.
Processing style – concrete/abstract
Participants’ answers were coded on the level of abstract think-
ing (focus on causes, meanings, and implications) and concrete
thinking (focus on concrete objects, sensory details, feelings, and
sensations). Each answer was rated on a scale ranging from 1
(not at all) to 4 (very much). A mean concrete and abstract
score was calculated for each participant. Distribution of these
ratings did not allow parametrical test due to skewed distribu-
tions. A non-parametric median test indicated that the induction
was successful. The median level of abstractness was significantly
higher in the abstract/verbal condition (Median= 3.80) than in
the concrete/imagery condition (Median= 1.00), χ2(1)= 62.28,
p< 0.001. Further, the median level of concreteness in the
concrete/imagery condition (Median= 3.20) was significantly
higher than in the abstract/verbal condition (Median= 1.10),
χ2(1)= 48.10, p< 0.001.
THE IMPACT OF PROCESSING STYLE, DEPRESSIVE SYMPTOMS, AND
DAMPENING ON POSITIVE AFFECT
To test if processing style (condition) influenced positive affect,
and to test if RPA-Dampening or BDI-II acted as moderators of
the association between processing style and positive affect, a hier-
archical multiple regression analysis was conducted with change in
positive affect from pre- to post-induction (positive affect after the
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induction minus positive affect at baseline) as dependent variable.
Centered scores were used for RPA-Dampening and BDI-II. In the
first step, condition, RPA-Dampening, and BDI-II were entered.
In the second step, the interaction between condition and RPA-
Dampening, and the interaction between condition and BDI-II
were entered. Results are depicted in Table 2.
Both models were significant, ps< 0.003. The interaction terms
were both non-significant (ps> 0.45). To facilitate interpretation
of the main effects, the first model without interaction terms was
examined (R2= 0.23). Importantly, there was a main effect of con-
dition, B= 0.73, p= 0.03. The change in positive affect was higher
in the concrete/imagery than in the abstract/verbal condition.
To investigate the direction of affective change within each
condition, two paired-samples t-tests were conducted. Within the
concrete/imagery condition, as predicted, positive affect increased
significantly over time, t (35)= 4.77, p< 0.001, d = 0.79. Positive
affect did not significantly change after abstract/verbal process-
ing, t (33)= 1.52, p= 0.14, d = 0.26. RPA-Dampening was a non-
significant predictor, B=−0.10, p= 0.08. There was a main effect
of BDI-II, B= 0.10, p< 0.001, such that, somewhat unexpected,
higher levels of depressive symptoms were associated with higher
values of affective change. So the change in positive affect from
pre- to post-induction was higher in the concrete/imagery than in
the abstract/verbal condition.
To investigate whether there would also be a delayed effect of
processing style, the hierarchical regression analysis was repeated
with the change in positive affect from post-induction to the end of
the experiment as dependent variable (n= 69, one missing value
for the last affect rating), see Table 2. Both models were significant,
ps< 0.02. In the first step, R2= 0.15, there was only a main effect of
BDI-II, B=−0.08, p= 0.001, which was in the opposite direction
than the main effect of BDI-II in the previous analysis (i.e., the
immediate change in positive affect). The change in positive affect
did not significantly differ between conditions. To investigate the
direction of affective change during the delay, a paired-samples
t-test was conducted. Positive affect decreased significantly dur-
ing the delay, t (68)= 3.77, p< 0.001, d = 0.45, meaning that, the
increased level of positive affect in the concrete/imagery condition
was not fully maintained after a delay. However, positive affect
at the end of the experiment was still significantly higher than at
baseline in the concrete/imagery condition, t (34)= 2.20, p= 0.04,
d = 0.37. Although positive affect slightly decreased during the
delay, there was no difference between positive affect at baseline
and at the end of the experiment in the abstract/verbal condition,
t (33)= 0.65, p= 0.52, d = 0.11.
The inclusion of the interaction terms in step two added
marginally significantly to the explained variance, ∆R2= 0.07,
p= 0.059. Importantly, this second step consisted of a non-
significant interaction between BDI-II and condition, whereas the
interaction between condition and RPA-Dampening was signif-
icant, B= 0.23, p= 0.02. The interaction with RPA-Dampening
revealed a significant positive relation between change in positive
affect and RPA-Dampening in the concrete/imagery condition,
B= 0.21, β= 0.53, p= 0.01, and not in the abstract/verbal con-
dition, p= 0.72. This means that the higher trait dampening in
the concrete condition, the smaller the decrease in positive affect
during the delay.
DISCUSSION
The affective impact of memory recall is not only determined by
the valence of the event but also by how it is processed. The cur-
rent study aimed to investigate the impact of concrete/imagery
vs. abstract/verbal processing of recall of a positive memory on
positive affect in a non-clinical sample. In addition, the role of
Table 2 | Hierarchical regression analyses: prediction of affective change (Study 1).
DV: PA2PA1 DV: PA3PA2
B SEB β B SEB β
Step 1
Condition 0.73* 0.33 0.48 −0.03 0.27 −0.03
RPA-Damp −0.10 0.06 −0.20 0.07 0.05 0.17
BDI-II 0.10*** 0.03 0.39 −0.08** 0.02 −0.40
Step 2
Condition 0.73* 0.33 0.48 −0.02 0.26 −0.02
RPA-Damp −0.13 0.07 −0.27 −0.02 0.06 −0.05
BDI-II 0.08* 0.04 0.33 −0.07* 0.03 −0.35
Condition×RPA-Damp 0.09 0.12 0.17 0.23* 0.09 0.58
Condition×BDI-II 0.04 0.06 0.18 −0.02 0.05 −0.12
PA2PA1 as criterion: R2 =0.23 for Step 1, ∆R2 =0.02 for Step 2 (p=0.47); PA3PA2 as criterion: R 2 =0.15 for Step 1, ∆R2 =0.07 for Step 2 (p=0.06).
DV, dependent variable. PA2PA1, positive affect after the induction minus positive affect at baseline; PA3PA2, positive affect at the end of the study minus positive
affect after the induction; BDI-II, Beck Depression Inventory-II; RPA-Damp, Dampening scale of the Responses to Positive Affect questionnaire (RPA). Centered
scores were used. Condition, abstract condition coded as 0 and concrete condition coded as 1. Significant predictors are indicated in bold. β’s indicate the regression
coefficients when predictors (except condition) and the dependent variable were standardized.
*p<0.05.
**p<0.01.
***p< 0.001.
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dampening and depressive symptoms as potential moderators was
investigated. As predicted, we found that positive memory recall
in a concrete/imagery way increased positive affect. This is in line
with earlier studies on imagining standardized positive scenarios
[e.g., Ref. (5, 15)] and with positive memory recall to repair sad
mood (16). Abstract/verbal processing did not influence positive
affect in our study. This is, as a general outcome here for pos-
itive autobiographical memories, less “negative” than an actual
mood deterioration (reduction in positive affect) found after ver-
bally/abstractly processing hypothetical positive situations (5, 15).
This suggests that abstract/verbal processing of a positive infor-
mation may not always lead to a mood deterioration [see also Ref.
(5, 20, 24)], though it does not appear to boost positive mood.
The affective impact of abstract/verbal processing was in our
sample not related to people’s tendency to dampen positive affect
in daily life. This suggests that, the extent to which people use
dampening thoughts in response to positivity (as measured via
the RPA) may not influence the immediate affective impact of
positive memory recall. However, the affective response to positive
memory recall was higher for people with higher levels of depres-
sive symptoms. To clarify this main effect of BDI-II, we present
a group approach. In the “high BDI-II group” (=BDI-II above
median), positive affect significantly increased from baseline to
post-induction (p< 0.001, d = 0.81), but there was no significant
change in affect in the “low-BDI-II group” (p= 0.13, d = 0.26).
This means that “dysphoric” participants were more responsive to
positive memory recall. This was not expected based on research
that revealed a reduced responding to non-autobiographical pos-
itive pictures in people with depressive disorder [e.g., Ref. (3)]
and a worsening of sad mood after positive memory recall (11).
An explanation could be that “dysphoric” participants retrieved
a more positive memory. However, positiveness of the event was
unrelated to BDI-II, r = 0.01. The counterintuitive main effect of
depressive symptoms might also be caused by a lower baseline state
affect in dysphoric participants, and so there was more room for
affective improvement. Baseline positive affect was indeed lower
in the “high BDI-II group” compared to the “low BDI-II group,”
p= 0.048. The main effect of BDI-II that we observed, however,
is in line with the so-called mood-brightening effect observed in
naturalistic settings: several studies have shown that in depressed
individuals and in individuals with elevated depressive sympto-
matology, positive events are followed by a greater decrease in
negative affect (31) and a greater increase in positive affect (32)
than in controls. Further research is needed to sort out the nature
of this effect.
We were also interested in the delayed affective responding to
memory recall. Overall, following a short delay, positive affect
decreased, but still remained slightly higher than at baseline for the
imagery/concrete condition. We make two notes. First, the affective
change was worse for people with increasing levels of depressive
symptoms. Again, to clarify this by a group approach, after the
delay, the“high BDI-II”group experienced a drop in positive affect,
p< 0.001, d = 0.79, while this was not the case for the “low-BDI-II
group,” p= 0.38, d = 0.15. This means that the increased immedi-
ate responding in people with more depressive symptoms had the
downside of a greater drop after a short interval. Depressed indi-
viduals fear or suppress positive affect (33), possibly because they
want to prevent that they will experience such a drop in positive
affect or that they will even feel worse afterwards. Second, on top
of the main effect of BDI-II, concrete/imagery processing had a
positive impact on the delayed affective response in participants
with increasing levels of a dampening response style. The results
suggest that after concrete memory recall, positive affect is better
maintained in individuals who dampen more, which points to the
importance of processing positive events in a concrete manner for
“vulnerable” individuals (in this case, high trait dampeners). One
possible explanation for this result is that the “dampeners” were
distracted from their habitual “abstract” (dampening) responses.
Some remarks can be made about this study. First, there were no
restrictions on the content of the chosen memory. Consequently,
participants retrieved different types of memories, for example
social or interpersonal (e.g., a nice chat with friends) or achieve-
ments (e.g., good exam results). It is plausible that meanings and
consequences for social memories are generally different than for
scholarly achievements. Second, there was no assessment of the
temporal distance of the memory. Given that age can influence
phenomenal characteristics of past events (34), it would be better
to check for potential differences between conditions on memory
age. Third, and critical to the next study, it has been suggested that
making (unfavorable) comparisons between positive scenarios
and the (less fortunate) self (5) or between a past happy event and
the (less positive) current life/self might be a crucial process that
undermines the benefits in positive information recall [e.g., Ref.
(16)]. Therefore, an interesting next step entails the comparison of
three processing styles in their affective outcome on positive mem-
ories: (1) a concrete/imagery style focused on the sensorial and
situation-specific details, vs. (2) abstract/verbal processing defined
as thinking about the broader meaning, causes, and consequences,
vs. (3) an abstract/verbal thinking style focused on making com-
parisons between the current self/life and the past self/life (“com-
parative/verbal”). The comparison with a comparative/verbal
thinking style would show whether it is a non-concrete/verbal pro-
cessing style that is unbeneficial or whether it is specifically making
(unfavorable) comparisons that is afforded by this processing style,
which undermines positive memory recall [cf. (5)].
STUDY 2
A second study was designed with three objectives: (1) to address
limitations of the first study, (2) to examine a third way in
which a positive memory could be processed by making verbal
comparisons, and (3) to examine mental imagery perspective.
Concerning the first objective, the content variability of the
memories in Study 1 was addressed by using the same mem-
ory for all participants. Passing an entrance exam is a necessary
condition to study medicine or dentistry in Flanders. As a conse-
quence, students of medicine and dentistry share this achievement.
This guided retrieval also aided to control the time period of the
memory (i.e., restricted to July, August, and September).
With regard to the second objective, a concrete/imagery-based
processing style was generally better than an abstract/verbal
processing style in Study 1. However, an abstract/verbal processing
style did not significantly deteriorate affect, which was the case in
some other studies with positive hypothetical scenarios [e.g., Ref.
(5)]. It is hypothesized that it is especially making unfavorable
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comparisons with positive events that is detrimental [e.g., Ref. (5),
cf. (35)]. Extending this to positive memories, past events might
act as a point of comparison to evaluate one’s present life (16,
36). Therefore, pleasant events could contrast with someone’s less
satisfactory current life, emphasizing negative aspects of the cur-
rent situation or self-deterioration. Joormann and Siemer (37)
and Joormann et al. (11) suggested that for depressed individuals
a positive memory may highlight that one is not that positive any-
more. Although the memory itself is positive, it comes to underline
the discrepancy between positive times in one’s past and the sad
mood or the less favorable situation now [see also Ref. (16)].
We included a third processing style in which individuals com-
pare their current self (current life) with the person they were
(the life they had) at the time the positive memory was investi-
gated (comparative/verbal). It has been suggested that especially
for depressed individuals a positive memory highlights the dis-
crepancy between the happy past moment and a sad current
life, or negative current self [e.g., Ref. (11)]. We predicted that
after adopting such a comparative/verbal thinking style, change in
positive affect would be less beneficial, especially with increasing
levels of depressive symptoms. We had no specific predictions with
regard to the delayed responding. For the concrete/imagery and
abstract/verbal styles, predictions are the same as in Study 1.
A third objective was to investigate the effect of processing style
on imagery perspective. Episodic memory is defined by including
sensory perceptual details (38, 39). That is, when remembering
a specific event, people typically generate mental images. These
mental images can be experienced from an observer perspective, in
which people observe themselves from the outside, or from a field
perspective, in which people experience the event again through
their own eyes (40). What was our reasoning behind this third,
perspective-related study objective? For example, research showed
that hypothetical situations, which are described at an abstract
level (e.g., the broader goal of the action), are more likely to be
imagined from an observer perspective than concretely described
actions (41). Similar results are found if participants think about
the broader meaning of a personal past event (graduation) vs. if
they focus on the experience (concrete details) (42). In addition,
some studies indicate that an observer perspective entails a nega-
tive evaluative component. That is, seeing oneself from the outside
facilitates a negative evaluation of the self and the imagined situ-
ation, or facilitates unfavorable comparisons between the self and
a positive situation (43–46) and could contribute to a negative
response in the face of recalling a positive event. Bringing this
together, we might expect less field (and more observer) perspec-
tive after abstract/verbal processing (as compared to concrete pro-
cessing). And, observer imagery in the abstract/verbal condition
could be more pronounced with increasing levels of dampening
(as dampening could be regarded as negatively evaluating some-
thing positive). We also expected less field (and more observer)
perspective after comparative/verbal thinking [cf. Ref. (43)].
METHOD
PARTICIPANTS
Participants were students of medicine and dentistry from the
KU Leuven (University of Leuven). They were invited through an
online university platform to participate in an online study. Par-
ticipants who completed all measures were included (n= 159).
Most participants were students of medicine (n= 123), 35 partic-
ipants studied dentistry, and 1 participant combined both studies
(see Table 3 for characteristics). Twenty randomly selected partic-
ipants received a gift voucher in exchange for participation. The
study was approved by the Ethical Committee of the Faculty of
Psychology and Educational Sciences, KU Leuven (University of
Table 3 | Sample characteristics, memory characteristics, and affect (Study 2).
Concrete/imagery
condition n=53
Abstract/verbal
condition n=53
Comparative/verbal
condition n=53
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Gender (freq female) 35 31 38
Age 21.15 2.46 20.38 1.44 20.83 4.82
DASS-Depression 4.09 3.43 4.57 3.75 3.83 5.57
RPA-Dampening 12.47 3.16 13.38 4.28 12.47 3.78
Number of sittings 2.02 1.22 1.96 1.02 2.08 1.02
Positivity of the event 7.77 0.99 8.08 0.81 7.57 1.01
Important/meaningful memory 7.66 1.87 7.77 1.75 7.34 1.69
Concentration 8.04 1.27 8.13 0.88 7.91 1.29
Positive affect
Baseline 5.92 1.58 6.11 1.38 6.51 1.01
After the induction 6.62 1.68 6.64 1.27 6.51 1.49
End of survey 5.92 1.65 5.96 1.49 6.17 1.67
Post-induction imagery perspective
Field 4.96 1.66 4.70 1.62 4.77 1.55
Observer 3.66 1.78 3.96 1.61 3.72 1.81
DASS-Depression, The Depression subscale of the Depression Anxiety and Stress Scale; RPA-Dampening, The Dampening subscale of the Responses to Positive
Affect questionnaire. Number of sittings, how many times participants attended the entrance exam.
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Leuven). Informed consent was obtained online before the start
of the study.
MEASURES
Affect assessment
Administration of positive and negative affect was as in Study 1.
However, this time, participants responded using a 9-point Likert
scale (cf. internet-based nature of Study 2).
Responses to positive affect questionnaire – dampening subscale
See Study 1 (21). The 7-item Dampening subscale was adminis-
tered, with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.78.
Depression anxiety stress scale – depression subscale
The Depression anxiety stress scale – depression subscale (DASS-
D) (47) assesses the severity of depressive symptoms for the past
7 days. Item scores range from 0 (did not apply to me at all) to 3
(applied to me very much or most of the time). The basic DASS-
D contains 14 items; we used the short version of the DASS-D
with 7 items. The Dutch version by de Beurs et al. (48) was used.
Cronbach’s alpha in the present sample was 0.84. We did not use
the 21-item BDI-II as in Study 1 to limit the time of the online
assessment.
Memory characteristics
Several Likert scales were used to assess baseline characteristics of
the event or memory,and to assess memory characteristics after the
induction. At baseline, participants were asked how positive they
found the moment when they were informed that they passed the
entrance exam (cf. Study 1, but, again not rated on a visual analog
scale but using a 9-point Likert scale). Participants additionally
rated to what extent the memory was an important and mean-
ingful memory for them personally, using a scale ranging from
totally not important and meaningful to very much important and
meaningful. Post-induction, students rated to what extent pass-
ing the entrance exam was characteristic for the person they are
now (this scale will not be discussed in the current paper). Age of
the event was assessed by determining the moment (month and
year) the event took place. Finally, we assessed imagery perspec-
tive. For that, participants were first asked to make an image of the
moment they were informed that they passed the entrance exam.
Next, they completed two 7-point scales: the first scale ranged from
(1) totally not first person to (7) completely first person; the second
scale ranged from (1) totally not third person to (7) completely third
person [similar scales were used in Ref. (49)].
Concentration
Because of the online format, participants were asked to what
extent they were able to complete the online tasks with concen-
tration (without being distracted) on a 9-point scale ranging from
totally not (1) to very good (9). Although participants are random-
ized to condition, we wanted to check whether individuals from
the three conditions would differ on how focused they were while
completing the questions.
PROCEDURE
After completing the online informed consent, participants filled
out a first measure of affect and self-focus (on a 9-point Likert
scale). Next, they were asked to rate the positivity of a specific
event, namely“the moment you were informed that you passed the
entrance exam.” This was followed by a rating of how important
and meaningful the memory is. Next, participants were random-
ized to one of the three conditions. Randomization to condition
was conducted automatically via the survey software Qualtrics.
Processing style was manipulated using a general condition-
specific instruction followed by seven condition-specific ques-
tions. Participants had to type their answer to each question in
full sentences. The induction was based on, and adapted from
previous research (5, 12, 13, 15, 16, 20, 50). Unlike in Study 1,
there was no time restriction per question used in the online
assessment.
In the concrete/imagery condition, participants were prompted
to focus on the moment, to replay the event in their mind as a
movie, and to form a sensory mental image. Comparable to Study
1, the condition-specific questions were what they could hear, see,
and what they felt when receiving their exam result, and what
they did immediately after. In addition, we prompted for more
details by asking how the moment unfolded, how they received
the exam result (e.g., via e-mail, phone), where they were, and
how bystanders behaved.
In the abstract/verbal condition, participants were asked to ver-
bally generate meanings about the situation. Comparable to Study
1, they were asked what the consequences and implications were,
how they thought about themselves, what the meaning was of the
event for their life, and what the performance said about their
capabilities. Instead of asking why the event happened to them,
they were asked more specifically how they explained that they
passed (succeeded in) the exam. Two extra questions assessed why
they felt the way they did, and whether the result (performance)
was as expected.
In the comparative/verbal condition, again, participants were
asked to use verbal language. They were asked how the person
they are now differs from the person they were at that moment,
and how their life is different now. They were also asked how they
expected their life would unfold at the time of the memory vs. how
it has turned out. One question focused on a social comparison
(how their performance compared to that of other students who
participated in the same exam).
After the processing induction, all participants completed a sec-
ond measure of affect and self-focus, followed by the assessment of
how characteristic the memory is and imagery perspective. Next,
we asked for demographics (such as gender and study level) and
details about the entrance exam (such as time). The Dampen-
ing subscale of the RPA and the Depression scale of the DASS
were completed and the study ended with a final measure of
affect and an assessment of their concentration during the online
study.
RESULTS
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND GROUP COMPARISONS
Five one-way ANOVAs showed that the conditions did not sig-
nificantly differ on age, depression score (DASS-D), level of
dampening (RPA-Dampening), concentration,or baseline positive
affect, 0.08< ps< 0.60. There were also no gender differences,
χ2(2)= 2.06, p= 0.36 (for descriptive, see Table 3).
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MEMORY CHARACTERISTICS
To exclude that the effects on affect were due to baseline memory
differences, several one-way ANOVAs were conducted. Condi-
tions did not differ on the mean number of times participants
sat the entrance exam, F(2, 156)= 0.14, p= 0.87, η2p = 0.002
or the level of importance/meaningfulness of the memory, F(2,
156)= 0.86, p= 0.43,η2p = 0.01. As expected, the mean positivity
rate was high and no one rated the entrance exam as totally not
positive. However, conditions significantly differed on how pos-
itive they perceived passing the entrance exam, F(2, 156)= 3.93,
p= 0.02, η2p = 0.05. Notice that this difference cannot be dri-
ven by the processing induction as that was afterward. Post hoc
t -tests revealed that positivity was significantly higher in the
abstract/verbal compared to the comparative/verbal condition,
t (104)= 2.87, p= 0.005, d = 0.56. Therefore, we controlled for
positivity in the following regression analyses. The entrance exam
took place during the year of the current research to a maximum
of 4 years previously, with the exception of one participant for
whom it was 6 years ago. Conditions did not differ for the age of
the event, F(2, 156)= 1.16, p= 0.32,η2p = 0.02. Means and SDs
are reported in Table 3.
MANIPULATION CHECKS
Self-focus
To verify if self-focus did not differ as a function of condi-
tion, a repeated measures ANOVA was conducted with time
(before vs. after the processing style induction) as a within-
subjects factor, condition (concrete/imagery, abstract/verbal, com-
parative/verbal) as a between-subjects factor, and self-focus as
the dependent variable. The interaction between time and con-
dition was not significant, F(2, 156)= 0.38, p= 0.69,η2p = 0.005.
The main effect of time was significant, F(1, 156)= 49.05,
p< 0.001,η2p = 0.24, d = 0.56. Comparable to Study 1, self-focus
increased after the processing style inductions.
Processing style
To analyze responses to the questions, 21 participants per condi-
tion were randomly selected. This group (n= 63) was comparable
to the others in terms of baseline memory characteristics and
DASS-D, ps> 0.10, but despite the random selection, they scored
lower on RPA-Dampening, p= 0.01. The written induction was
coded in terms of level of concreteness (to what extent does the
answer focus on sensorial information or on the concrete unfold-
ing of the situation), abstractness (to what extent does the answer
tell you something about meanings, causes (why they passed the
exam), consequences, or why they felt the way they did), and the
level of comparative thinking (to what extent is the answer about
the person at the time of the event and the comparison with then
vs. now or vs. others, the expectations then vs. how it is now, and
the time in between).
We used a scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much).
Distribution of the ratings did not allow significance tests (limited
range on the scores within each condition), therefore descrip-
tives are reported. As expected, comparative thinking was high in
the comparative condition (M= 4.05, range 3–5), whereas there
was almost no comparative thinking in the other two condi-
tions (range 1–2). Ratings for concrete thinking were high in
the concrete/imagery condition (M= 4.86, range 4–5), but less
pronounced in the other two conditions (range 1–3). Abstract
thinking was high in the abstract/verbal condition (M= 4.67,
range 4–5), low in the concrete/imagery condition (M= 1.38), and
somewhat represented in the comparative condition (M= 2.90,
range 1–4). In each condition, 11 of the 21 texts were randomly
selected and recoded by a second researcher. For each scale, an
intraclass correlation coefficient between the score of rater 1 and
rater 2 was calculated. The correlation coefficients are 0.94 for con-
crete thinking, 0.85 for abstract thinking, and 0.95 for comparative,
suggesting a good interrater reliability.
THE IMPACT OF PROCESSING STYLE AND DEPRESSIVE SYMPTOMS ON
POSITIVE AFFECT
To test the impact of processing style on positive affect and to test
the hypothesis that there would be an interaction of condition
and depressive symptoms, we conducted a hierarchical multiple
regression analysis with the change in positive affect from pre- to
post-induction (positive affect after the induction minus positive
affect at baseline) as the criterion variable. Because of the increased
number of predictors in the second study, regression analyses
were separately conducted for DASS-D and RPA-Dampening. In
Step 1, positivity of the event was entered as a control variable
(due to baseline differences between conditions). In Step 2, DASS-
D scores, and two dummy variables to specify condition were
included. The abstract/verbal condition functioned as the ref-
erence group. Finally, in Step 3, the interaction terms – which
specify the interaction between condition and depressive symp-
toms – were entered. For DASS-D, and the positivity of the event,
we used centered scores. Table 4 summarizes the hierarchical
regression analysis. For all three steps, the model was signifi-
cant, p< 0.001. In the first step, positivity of the event was a
significant predictor of change in positive affect. Next, in Step 2,
the level of depressive symptoms was not a significant predictor.
There was a significant main effect of condition, in such that the
change in positive affect was higher in the abstract/verbal com-
pared to the comparative/verbal condition, but the abstract/verbal
and concrete/imagery condition did not significantly differ.
To know in what direction affect changed from pre- to post-
induction within each condition, we conducted three paired-
samples t -tests. Means and SDs are depicted in Table 3. As
predicted, in the concrete/imagery condition, positive affect sig-
nificantly increased, t (52)= 5.45, p< 0.001, d = 0.75 (M = 0.70,
SD= 0.93). In the abstract/verbal condition (for which the mean
change did not significantly differ from the concrete/imagery con-
dition), positive affect also significantly increased, t (52)= 3.73,
p< 0.001, d = 0.51 (M = 0.53, SD= 1.03). In the comparative
condition, positive affect remained unchanged after the induction,
t (52)= 0, d = 0 (M = 0, SD= 1.09).
In the comparative/verbal condition, affective change was
dependent on depressive symptoms. That is, importantly and as
hypothesized, the main effect of condition was qualified by an
interaction effect in the third step. The slope representing the
relationship between DASS-D and affective change significantly
differed between the abstract/verbal condition and the compara-
tive/verbal condition. To interpret this interaction, we present the
slope for the relation between DASS-D and affective change within
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Table 4 | Hierarchical regression analysis: prediction of affective
change after processing of the positive memory (Study 2).
B SE B β
Step 1
Positivity 0.29*** 0.09 0.27
Step 2
Positivity 0.25** 0.09 0.23
Dummy 1 0.24 0.20 0.23
Dummy 2 −0.41* 0.20 −0.39
DASS-D −0.01 0.02 −0.04
Step 3
Positivity 0.26** 0.09 0.23
Dummy 1 0.26 0.19 0.25
Dummy 2 −0.42* 0.20 −0.39
DASS-D 0.03 0.04 0.10
Dummy 1×DASS −0.001 0.06 −0.004
Dummy 2×DASS −0.12* 0.05 −0.40
R2 =0.07 for Step 1, ∆R2 =0.06 for Step 2 (p= 0.01), ∆R2 =0.03 for Step 3
(p= 0.046).
PA2PA1, change in positive affect from pre- to post-induction (positive affect
after the induction minus positive affect at baseline); Positivity, self-reported pos-
itivity of the event; DASS-D, Depression subscale of the Depression Anxiety
Stress Scales. Centered scores were used. Dummy 1, concrete/imagery con-
dition coded as 1, the other two conditions as 0; Dummy 2, comparative/verbal
condition coded as 1, the other two conditions as 0. Significant predictors are
indicated in bold. β indicates the regression coefficients when predictors (except
condition) and the dependent variable were standardized.
*p<0.05.
**p<0.01.
***p<0.001.
each condition. As expected, in the comparative condition, higher
DASS-D scores were associated with a lower value of the change
score, B=−0.09, β=−0.30 p= 0.02, whereas the slope did not
significantly differ from zero in the concrete/imagery condition,
B= 0.03, β= 0.09, p= 0.51, and in the abstract/verbal condition
(see Table 4).
THE IMPACT OF PROCESSING STYLE AND DAMPENING ON POSITIVE
AFFECT
The same hierarchical regression analysis as described above
was conducted, however, with DASS-D score changed by RPA-
Dampening. This regression analysis did, again, reveal the same
main effect of condition. However, there was no main effect of
RPA-Dampening, and the two interaction terms did not signifi-
cantly add to the explained variance of change in positive affect
(∆R 2 < 0.001).
THE DELAYED AFFECTIVE IMPACT OF PROCESSING STYLE
The regression analyses were repeated with, as the criterion, the
change in positive affect from post-induction to the end of the
survey. The models with DASS-D as well as the models with
RPA-Dampening were non-significant (ps> 0.14).
From post-induction to the end of the survey, positive
affect significantly decreased in the concrete/imagery and the
abstract/verbal condition (ps< 0.001), but not in the compara-
tive condition (p= 0.08), such that in all three conditions, positive
affect at the end of the survey did not differ from baseline affect,
ps> 0.10.
THE IMPACT OF PROCESSING STYLE ON IMAGERY PERSPECTIVE
Using two one-way ANOVAs, the effect of processing style (con-
dition) on field perspective and observer perspective was exam-
ined (see Table 3). Conditions did not differentially influence
imagery perspective, ps> 0.63. To inspect associations with RPA-
Dampening and DASS-D, correlations were calculated within
each condition. RPA-Dampening was not significantly associated
with imagery perspective. With regard to the DASS-D, depressive
symptoms were negatively associated with field perspective rat-
ings in the comparative condition, r(53)=−0.28, p= 0.04, but
not in the other two conditions, rs<−0.14, ps> 0.33. However,
the correlation in the comparative condition did not signifi-
cantly differ from the correlations in the other two conditions
(ps> 0.41).
DISCUSSION
The aim of this study was to investigate the effect of process-
ing style manipulation of retrieval of a positive memory on
positive affect (immediate and delayed) and on mental imagery
perspective. Based on previous investigations, we compared three
thinking styles: concrete/imagery, abstract/verbal, and compara-
tive/verbal. We also investigated the role of self-reported dampen-
ing during daily life and current depressive symptoms as poten-
tial moderators. All participants thought back about the same
achievement – an exam.
As expected, positive affect increased after concrete/imagery
processing of the positive memory, replicating our Study 1, and
extending results in previous related papers. However,unlike Study
1, here the abstract/verbal condition did also lead to an increase
in positive affect, showing that generally abstract/verbal thinking
might not be maladaptive under certain conditions. This would
at least be without a focus on the comparative thinking element
[cf. (5)] and for a positive content. A necessary condition to gain
positive mood while generally abstract/verbal might be that the
positive memory receives a strong meaning in someone’s life:
this was reflected in the generation of positive meanings in the
abstract/verbal condition (e.g., “it meant a lot for me,” “it teaches
me that with dedication you can excel in life,” “it showed that I have
more capacities than I thought”).
In analogy with our results, an abstract processing style in com-
bination with a lab-induced success experience yielded the same
affective outcomes as a concrete processing style (51). This was
the case for low as well as high dysphorics. Non-deleterious effects
of abstract processing have also been shown in social psychology.
Marigold et al. (24) hypothesized that people with low self-esteem
(who tend to dampen the positivity of a partner’s compliment)
would profit from an abstract processing of a partner’s compliment
[see also Ref. (52)]. Indeed, people with low self-esteem who were
prompted to verbally describe the meaning of a past compliment
felt happier compared to participants who were asked to describe
the isolated, concrete details of the moment they received a past
compliment (24).
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Unexpectedly, the immediate affective response as well as
the delayed responding was independent of self-reported damp-
ening responses during daily life, partially replicating results
from Study 1. The fact that the affective response in the con-
crete/imagery and abstract/verbal processing conditions was inde-
pendent of depressive symptoms suggests that people with higher
levels of depressive symptoms are, at least under certain circum-
stances, able to profit from positive memory recall [e.g., when
thinking back about important achievements without making
(unfavorable) comparisons].
As expected, making comparisons between the current
self/situation with the past self/situation in the memory was less
helpful and did not increase positive mood over time. Impor-
tantly, in line with the prediction, the affective impact of making
such comparisons was worse with increasing levels of depressive
symptoms. It is unlikely that this is driven by a ceiling effect for
individuals with higher levels of depressive symptoms, given that
they started with lower positive affect at baseline. Plausibly, a
general discrepancy between the current negative self or life sit-
uation and the past positive situation drives this effect. In this
reasoning, we assume that especially in individuals with depres-
sive symptoms a discrepancy between the past happy situations
and the current life may exist, driving unfavorable comparisons.
This discrepancy is less easily triggered while using a more con-
crete/imagery or abstract/verbal thinking style without explicit
comparisons. The “risky” side of comparing oneself (or one’s cur-
rent life circumstances) with a positive event was also present in
Holmes et al. (5) for hypothetical events. Our study now reveals
that this also pertains to real personal positive events from the
past. An implication is that if working with positive stimuli, we
should take care not to get stuck in unbeneficial comparative
thinking.
Importantly, passing an entrance exam is particularly related
to expectations and predictions about the future university years.
Therefore, making comparisons between now and then might eas-
ily prompt unachieved expectancies with regard to one’s academic
performances. Indeed, if we control for how satisfied partici-
pants are with how their studies unfold, the association between
depressive symptoms and affect change in the comparative con-
dition becomes marginally significant (β=−0.23, p= 0.085),
although the interaction between condition and depressive symp-
toms remains significant. This suggests that the effect may also
be driven by the current state of the life domain from the
memory.
The three thinking styles did not differentially influence
imagery perspective of the recalled event. However, in another
between-subjects investigation, students who thought abstractly
about their graduation were more likely to recall the memory
from an observer perspective relative to students who adopted
a concrete processing style (42). The induction was comparable
but not identical, though, speculatively, the differential imagery
measure between studies (dichotomous vs. continuous) might be
a candidate explanation for the mixed results.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In two studies, we investigated the impact of processing style dur-
ing positive memory recall on positive affect. We also considered
the role of dampening and depressive symptoms as potential
moderators.
A focus on the sensory experience of the positive event (con-
crete/imagery processing) improved positive affect for a positive
memory that was self-generated (Study 1) and experimenter-
chosen (i.e., an academic achievement, Study 2). This parallels
evidence with standardized positive hypothetical scenarios [e.g.,
Ref. (5,15)] and extends research on the concrete recall of a positive
memory to repair sad mood in (previously) depressed individuals
(16) to increasing positive affect in the absence of a negative mood
induction in a non-clinical sample.
Results also support the development of training procedures to
help make depressed individuals more specific and concrete in the
retrieval of their memories [e.g., Ref. (53)] and boost their posi-
tive mental imagery of hypothetical and future events [e.g., Ref. (9,
54–56)]. It is likely that the combination of the concrete/imagery
processing style with a positive content drives the increase in posi-
tive affect [for a control with a neutral or negative content, see Ref.
(57, 58)].
Considering abstract/verbal processing of a memory (i.e.,
thinking about the broader meaning, causes, and consequences
of the event), in neither of the two studies did abstract/verbal
processing cause significant mood deterioration; however, it failed
to lead to a beneficial effect in the controlled lab environment
in Study 1. This affective outcome is thus less detrimental than
contrast effects (i.e., mood deterioration) with positive memories
observed in a depressed sample (11) and with hypothetical positive
events in non-clinical samples (5, 15, 43). Speculatively, the differ-
ent outcome for abstract/verbal processing in Study 1 and Study 2
might be driven by the content of the memory or the control over
the study environment. Another possibility is that the abstract
instructions in the second study were adjusted to the memory
and included positive connotations (e.g., what do you think about
your performance). This might have stimulated to derive a positive
meaning. Indeed, Marigold et al. (24) confirmed that such subtle
positive framework avoids self-evaluative concerns in individuals
with low self-esteem.
We also examined delayed responses to memory recall. Delayed
responses were characterized by a decrease in positive affect in both
studies. In general, the pattern indicated that people ended at their
baseline level of positive affect (note that in the imagery/concrete
condition of Study 1 positive affect did not entirely drop to base-
line after the delay). In both studies, the delay phase included
the assessment of questionnaires (such as a depressive symptom
scale), which might have been mood triggering. Ideally, positive
imagery protects against later mood triggers. In previous investi-
gations, an elaborated imagery training protected against future
negative mood (5) and positive affect was maintained during a
10 min neutral filler (17).
With regard to dampening as a suggested moderator, unexpect-
edly, the immediate as well as the delayed impact of abstract/verbal
processing was not worse for people characterized by dampen-
ing responses. This means that although people have a stronger
dampening cognitive style in response to positive affect, they do
not appear more vulnerable to the effects of abstract/verbal think-
ing about a positive memory. We should note, however, that high
levels of dampening might be not sufficiently resembled in the
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present samples. We also note that we investigated “trait” damp-
ening responses to positive affect. For future research, it would be
interesting to include a state measure of dampening [cf. LeMoult
et al. (59) for state rumination].
In the second study, we compared two less concrete/imagery-
based processing styles (abstract/verbal vs. comparative/verbal).
As hypothesized, comparative/verbal thinking yielded different
responding than abstract/verbal thinking. This suggests that ver-
bal processing itself is not necessarily a problem, but rather it is
the combination with making (unfavorable) comparisons, which
makes it less adaptive. Importantly, comparative thinking was
especially detrimental for individuals with higher levels of depres-
sive symptoms. Overall, this suggests that, at least with this type
of achievement memory, comparative thinking (presumably unfa-
vorable comparisons) turns out to be the unbeneficial factor and
not the abstractness of thinking as such. Interestingly, given that
abstract/verbal processing did not increase positive affect in Study
1, but did in Study 2, it is unclear whether the difference between
abstract and comparative-based thinking in Study 2 was solely dri-
ven by the negative ingredients of comparative thinking or also by
positive aspects of the abstract/verbal induction. It will be impor-
tant to replicate this study and investigate it with different types of
memories.
The interpretation of the results and comparison of the two
studies have some final limitations. First, we are aware that the
comparison of the two studies is limited due to method differ-
ences. For example, two different measures of depressive symp-
toms were used and the numerical anchors of the affect scales
differed. Second, both studies were limited to student samples
and we did not collect diagnostic information on depressive
status. Therefore, we should remain cautious when interpret-
ing our results in the context of clinically depressed patients or
persons at risk for (relapse/recurrence of) clinical depression.
Third, in both studies, we did not include a neutral control
condition, therefore we cannot conclude whether the differences
between conditions are driven by the active positive effect of
a concrete/imagery-based processing style. Fourth, both studies
were not conducted in an individual setting. Although similar
manipulations were conducted in a group context (50) or via inter-
net (24), it is recommended to repeat the study in an individual
setting.
Overall, the present studies support the potential of trainings
in positive mental imagery with autobiographical material. In
addition, the studies stress taking care of thought patterns when
working with (autobiographical) positive stimuli in therapy and
underline the need for research into parameters that determine
the outcome of abstract/verbal processing.
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